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1. Gibbard [4) has recently introduced a Pareto-consistent libertarian
claim, designed to explicate Sen's Liberal Paradox [9]. The question
this paper asks is whether all—or any—social choice functions satisfying
Gibbard's claim are worthly of libertarian approval. This paper argues
that there is a unique such social choice function. This function,
denoted f*, has the following properties: outcomes chosen by f* belong
to the von Neumann-Morgenstern set of imputations (Proposition 1), and
Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are outcomes chosen by f* (Proposition 2).
Gibbard remarks that his claim "succeeds in expressing an important
part of what many libertarians want to say " [4, p. 388]. One obviously
missing feature of his claim is that of group rights. Now f* can be
extended in a Pareto-consistent, self-consistent way to account for
such rights (Theorem 3). Indeed, outcomes under f* so extended belong
to the Aumann-Maschler set of individually rational payoff configura
tions (Proposition 4). In this way, f*—in the case of individual
rights—and its extension—in the case of group rights—frame a set
of outcomes for further game-theoretic study.
2. We begin by recalling Gibbard's framework [A, pp. 390-1]. A
state of the world, 2^,is a u-tuple of features, . .. ,x^) . These
features are indexed by the set I of issues; I = Each
feature x. belongs to a set of alternatives , containing at least two
members. The set of possible social states, M, equals the cartesian
product X... X M .
The set N of individuals is given by N = (l,...,v). Each
individual b £ N has a complete, transitive preference ordering of
M. A preference v-tuple is a v-tuple of preference
orderings. A social choice function f(P_» M, ^ ) is a function whose
domain consists of a preference v-tuple the set of possible social
states M, and other relevant information An example of ^ is coalition
structure—that is. how N is partitioned. The range of f is a non
empty subset C of M. We shall hereafter abbreviate "social choice
function" by "SCF."
In this framework, a natural way to introduce rights is by way
of the issues. Two social states x and ^ are j-variants if and only
if x^ = y^ for all i j. Equivalently, such social states may be
called M - (j) invariants. Suppose issue j has been assigned to
individual b. Then, if x and y are j-variants, and y i C, except
under exceptional circumstances [4, pp. 398-9]. Thus, individual b's
right resides in issue j, and his opportunities consist of the alterna
tive features in . Rights in this sense take the form of an assign
ment mapping A, from M to N. The mapping that assigns rights, A,
frames the social choice functions that respect individuals rights.
Gibbard's roajor result is the following: if v , then there
exists a SCF f satisfying the libertarian claim and the Pareto principle
[A, Thm. Al. The libertarian claim is that "for every individual b,
there is a feature j such that for every pair of j-variants sc and
f accords b an alienable right to x over [A, Condition L*' on f].
The Pareto principle is that if all individuals prefer x and then
^ C [A, Condition P on f]. The proof is by construction, utilizing
the rights assignment
A(i) = i, i V
A(i) undefined, y^i>v
No claim for the uniqueness of f is made, since f in general depends
on the rights assignment A. Although any onto assignment mapping will
satisfy Condition L** on f, it is questionable whether every assignment
mapping will do from the standpoint of libertarian principle.
The standard applications of libertarian principles have always been
to an individual's conscience, to his thoughts and feelings, to his
self-expression [5, p. 15-6; 7, p. 61], As Mill says, "Over himself,
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign," [5, p.13]. If
Gibbard's framework is to be one to which libertarian principles
usually apply, the features have first to refer to individual's actions
or states of being. Thus, part of the description of the world is an
original assignment, B, also a map from the set of features M to the set
of individuals N. The original assignment is both into and onto:
every issue in the world is tied to some individual, and every individual
has a logical role to play in the world. We shall call the set B^ (b) =
"ie M: B(i) =hj- individual b's opportunity set [1, p. 12], its
members being those issues in the world logically dependent on what b
is or what b does.
Whether an assignment of rights Ameets with libertarian approval
hinges on whether it agrees with the original assignment B. Any
assignment of rights Afor which A^ Bis open to objection. Take the
case where A(l) = b and B(i) = c. Then the assignment of rights
authorizes an invasion of c's privacy--c's action is determined in
accordance with b's preferences. Again, suppose that ie B (b) but
i ^ A~^(b). Then individual b has the opportunity i without the
corresponding right. Suppose further that there is no other individual
c such that ie a'^(c). Then there is nothing to keep b from availing
himself of his opportunity, nothing to prevent his having as strong
say on feature i as if he had the right. Individual b has a right by
default, as it were. Thus, whenever the assignment of rights differs
from the original assignment, it is so much the worse for the
assignment of rights.
The unique SCF which satisfies A= B we shall denomf*. When
A= B, every individual has a right to his opportunities and an
opportunity for his rights. We have argued then that f* is the unique
SCF given by Gibbard's Theorem 4 which is worthy of libertarian approval
3. In this section we investigate the appeal of f* from the point of
view of game theory.
We introduce the real-valued representation of u^: M-*• R^.
The existence of u^ is guaranteed by the finiteness of Mand the
transitivity of P^. No claim is made as to the measurabilicy or
transferability of utility; u^ can be thought of in strictly ordinal
terms. To each possible social state e M, there corresponds the
utility vector ji(3c) =(^u^(3c) ,.. ., "yCiS)y* Establishing a connection
between the social states f* chooses and utility outcomes under
von Neumann-Morgenstern game theory calls first for the following
definitions [cf. 2, p. 7]:
Definition 1. Let b be an individual. Then
v(b) = max min ^ *
IIM^ TTM.
j 1
jeA ^(b) ie M
1^: A~^(b)
Intuitively, v(b) is the utility which individual b can secure
regardless of the actions of the rest of society.
Definition 2. The social state x is rational for individual b if
%W 1 •
Definition 3. The social state x is group rational if there exists no
social state ^ such that for all individuals b,
\(y) ^ M •
Clearly, a social state is group rational if and only if it satisfies
the Pareto principle.
6Definition 4. The social state x corresponds to a von Neumann-
Moregenstern imputation ^(x) if ^ is rational for every individual b and
X is group rational. Now one can establish the following
Proposition 1. If f* chooses x, then x corresponds to a von Neumann-
Moregenstern imputation.
Proof. Since f* is Pareto-satlsfactory, x is group rational. Suppose
for some individual b, 3c is not individually rational. Then there
exists a social state x' differing from x on the set of Issues A^(b),
such that
u^ (x') > u^ (x) .
Further, if x'* is any variant to x' on the set of issues M-A ^(b), then
u^(x') ^ min u^(x'*) ^ v(b) > Uj^(x).
Thus, individual b's objection to x cannot be overcome by the rest
of society, individual b's right to x* over x is never waived, and
X is not chosen by f*.
We denote by C* the choice set of f*. The reflection of C* in
utility space, like the concepts of stable set and core, is a subset
of the space of imputations.
Example 1 [4, p. 395; 9, p. 80] This example shows how f* solves the
Liberal Paradox.
y = V = 2, A is the identity mapping, and for all i, = ' 0,
Preferences are as follows:
social state u^ U2
(1. 1) 14
(1, 0) 3 3
(0, 1) 2 2
(0. 0) 4 1
Since v(l) = v(2) = 2, the unique imputation is the social state (1, 0)
with ^(1, 0) = (3» 3). By Proposition 1, the social state (1, 0) is also
the unique choice of f*.
To get Sen*s example, it suffices to set individual 1 equal to
his Mr. A, the prude; individual 2, equal to his Mr. B, the lascivious;
social state (0, 0) equal to his outcome c_; social state (1, 0), equal
to his outcome social state (0, 1), equal to his outcome The
context makes it clear that Che social state (1, 1)—"both Mr. A and
Mr. B read Lady Chatterly's Lover"—would be ranked as shown.
Example 2. This example shows that the converse of Proposition 1 does
not hold.
y=V=3, Ais the Identity mapping, and for all i, = "jo, Ij" .
Preferences are as follows:
social state u^ u^ u^
(1,1.1) 8 1 1
(1.1.0) 7 2 2
(1.0,1) 6 3 3
(1,0,0) 5 4 I*
(0,1,1) 4 5 5
(0,1,0) 3 6 6
(0,0,1) 2 7 7
(0,0,0) 1 8 8
Since v(l) = 5, v(2) = 3, and v(3) = 2, the social states (1,0,1)
and (1,0,0) correspond to von Neumann-Moregenstem imputations. However,
f* only chooses (1,0,0). The social state (1,0,1) is not chosen because
individual 3 claims his right to (1,0,0) over (1,0,1) and his claim leads
to no further disapproval.
Example 3. [4, pp. 398-9] Here we show that the case of Edwin vs
Angelina gives rise to a single imputation. Individual l=Edwin;
individual 2=Angelina.
Preferences are as follows:
social state U2
^ 3 1
%
2 3
1 2
v(l) = 1, since Edwin cannot be sure that Angelina will not marry
v(2) = 2, since Angelina can always marry the willing judge. The
sole imputation is w„. Thus, the motivating example behind Gibbard's
—E
Condition L*' on f is in the spirit of our Proposition 1.
A partial characterization of the choices made under f* is the
following:
Proposition 2. If x is a Pareto-optimum and Nash-equilibrium, then
X e C*, i.e. f* chooses x*
Proof. If x is a Nash-equilibrium, then for no individual b is it
the case that
^ » where ^ and x are A^(b) variants.
Thus, no individual has an objection to Xf 2£ satisfies Condition
L'' on f. Since, by hypothesis, x is also a Pareto-optimum, f*
chooses X.
Example 2 illustrates the propostion, the social state (1,0,0) there
being a Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum. In example 1, the
social state (0,1) is a Nash equilibrium but not a Pareto optimum, and
so it not chosen by f*.
4. In this section we extend f* to account for the rights of groups.
Let S be any group of individuals. We let the rights of group
S consist of the issues of world assigned to group S, where the assign
ment to a group is defined by
A~^(S) = U A^(b).
beS
A group has the right to do whatever its members have the right to
do—no more, no less.
Two aspects of group rights need to be settled before proceeding.
First, does an individual surrender his rights by joining a group?
We answer this question in the negative: group rights must continue to
respect the rights of member individuals. Second, does a group which
has not actually formed have rights? Again, our answer is negative:
the only groups whose rights must be respected are those that actually
exist.
Suppose that group S has formed and that the social states x
and ^ vary on the set of issues A^(S) only. Then S claims its
right to X over ^ when it is the case that for all b in S, x P^.
We shall write this as x This is reminiscent of, but not
exactly the same as, the dominance relation of von Neuraann-
Morgenstern theory.
Informally speaking, our extension of f*, denoted consists
of those social states chosen by f* which also respect the rights
of groups which actually form.
Formally, let ^ be a partition of N. The elements of K are
precisely the groups that actually form. Then f* is a
6XC
function whose domain consists of a preference v-tuple P, the choice
set of C* of f*, and a partition ^ of N. It remains to show that the
range of f* is not empty—in other words, that f* is truly a SCF.
0XC
Theorem 3. f* (P, C^, p is a SCF.
W A
Let Q be the relation defined by
X P- for some S e£, or for S » N
f*e^t generated by Q in the following manner:
x: C* & ^ [2. e C* xQiSl
The choice set of f*g2jt orily be empty if there is at least one cycle
x^qx^...Qx^Qx^,
where are members of C*. Suppose that there is such a cycle.
Since every member of C* is immune from individual objections, every
step in the cycle must be taken by a group of at least two individuals.
However, all such groups must belong to ^ partition of N, and are
therefore mutually disjoint. Then, as in [4, Thm. 4], a cycle can only
be completed if one of the steps is a Pareto-objection,
. But all the members of C* are Pareto-optima; hence no such
Pareto-objection can be made. Therefore the cycle cannot be completed
and the result is proved.
The construction of Is reminiscent of ideas surrounding
the bargaining sets of game theory [3, 6]. We can make this connection
precise.
Proposition 4. If x is chosen by f* (P^, C*^ ), then x corresponds
to an imputation which is also an individually rational payoff configura
tion.
Proof. Immediate from the following definition, and the argument of
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Proposition 1 applied to a group S.
Definition 5 [cf. 6, p. 197]. An individually rational payoff configura
tion is a pair ^(x) > ^ where ? is a partition of N, x is Individually
rational, and if SeC, then S cannot improve upon x by its ovm efforts.
The following example shows how refines f*.
Example 4. p = v = 3, A is the identity mapping, and for all i, M^= 0,lj,
Preferences are as follows:
social state u, u- u„
(1.1.1) 3 3 7
(1.1.0) 2 2 6
(1,0,1) 7 1 5
(1.0.0) 6 0 4
(0,1,1) 1 7 3
(0,1,0) 0 6 2
(0,0,1) 5 5 1
(0,0,0) 4 4 0
C* = (1,1,1), (0,0,1)
If ^ » (1), (2), (3) (1), (2,3)^. or
then f* makes the same choices as f*.
ext
(2), (1,3)
If C = (3), (1,2) then f* chooses only (0,0,1).
ext ^ N » » /
In this example, individuals 1 and 2 are in the prisoner's dilemma
whatever individual 3 does, f* ^ lets them out of that dilemma when
ext
they join forces.
One might think that the restriction that ^ be a partition of N
is too strong, that the rights of all groups, actual or potential,
must be protected. In particular, this attitude leads to the core
N
when i ~ 2 * However, it is easy to show that the core is empty-
cycles of the kind forbidden by Theorem 3 can arise when C is not
a partition.
Example 5. p = v « 3, A is the identity mapping, and for all i.
II
Preferences are as follows:
social state "l "2 ."3
(1,1,1) 1 1 1
(1,1,0) 4 2 3
(1.0,1) 2 3 4
(1,0,0) 4 2 3
(0,1,1) 3 4 2
(0,1.0) 3 4 2
(0.0,1) 2 3 4
(0,0.0) 1 1 1
C* = (1,1,0),(1,0,1),(0,1,1)J, these being Pareto-optlmal Nash
equilibria.
If ^ =
If C =
If C =
(1.2), (3)1 then f* chooses
(1.3). (2) then f*.
(2.3), (1)
ext
chooses
then f* ^ chooses
ext
However, in this case the core is empty.
(0,1,1),(1,1,0)
(1,1,0),(1,0,1)
(1,0,1),(0,1,1)
Restrictions required for a non-empty core [see 8, Theorem 1]
are much stronger than those of the framework developed here.
12
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5. This paper has identified a unique social choice function* f*,
which both satisfies Gibbard's Pareto-consistent libertarian claim and
deserves libertarian approval. We have also seen how far f* can be
extended into the realm of group rights. However, several important
questions remain open. First, the relationship between f* and Arrow's
famous conditions [1, chapter 3] has not been investigated. Although
f* aOd its extension satisfy nondictatorship and the Pareto condition,
it is likely that they fail both collective rationality and the
independence condition. Second, the view of the world taken in this
paper has been exclusively methodologically individual. It would
be Interesting to consider the counterpart of when groups can
do things that individuals cannot. Finally, there is the question of
whether other f^iliar SCF's, for instance Condorcet's rule of Borda*s
rule, agree with f*. In so far as they do not, credence is lent to
the view that certain aspects of a person's life are not to be put to
a vote. This also makes libertarian antipathy to majority rule more
understandable.
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